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NOTES
Interpreting State Aid to Religious Schools Under the
Establishment Clause: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District
The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause' in cases dealing with public aid to sectarian schools has undergone
significant changes since the Court first dealt with the issue almost fifty
years ago.2 At that time, the Court declared that the Establishment Clause
was "intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' 3
Nevertheless, the Court recently held in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District4 that state funding of a sign-language interpreter provided to
a deaf student attending a Catholic high school did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.5
This Note traces the development of the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as it relates to public aid to sectarian schools and
examines the basis of the Court's current view as expressed in Zobrest.6
The Note posits that Zobrest repre§ents an unprecedented move by the
Court towards accommodating public aid to religious schools.7 In addition,
the Note suggests that Zobrest may represent a new method of Establish-
ment Clause interpretation in which the Court bases its holdings solely on
factual similarities of previous cases instead of invoking the Lemon test.8
The Note concludes that such an approach is likely to make Establishment
Clause analysis even more unpredictable than it is now.9
James Zobrest has been deaf since birth.' 0 In 1988, his parents en-
rolled him in a Roman Catholic high school in Tucson, Arizona. Pursuant
to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)" and a corre-
1. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The Court first addressed the issue in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The Everson
decision, however, also illustrates a tension in Establishment Clause interpretation between the
separation of church and state and the funding of education. See infra notes 40-47 and accompa-
nying text.
4. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
5. Id. at 2469.
6. See infra notes 39-138 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 139-74 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
10. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, 1401, 1412, 1413, 1414(a), 1415 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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sponding state statute, the Zobrests asked the public school district to pro-
vide a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to class .l7 The school
district denied the request because of their conclusion that such aid would
violate the Establishment Clause. 3 The Zobrests then initiated a civil ac-
tion 4 asserting "that the IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment require[d] [the school district] to provide James with an inter-
preter [at the Catholic school], and that the Establishment Clause [did] not
bar such relief."' 5
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the
Zobrests' request for a preliminary injunction. 6 The court concluded that
such aid would likely violate the Establishment Clause because the inter-
preter would be a conduit for James's religious education and would thus
promote "religious development at government expense."' 7 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,'" holding that the
interpreter's function of relating both secular educational lessons and reli-
gious teachings would have the primary effect of advancing religion in vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause.' 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed.20 The Court held that the
Establishment Clause did not prevent the school district from providing an
interpreter because the aid was "part of a general government program that
distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under
12. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The state statute was Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-761,
15-764 to 15-769 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring special educational provisions for exceptional
children). James attended a school for the deaf during grades one through five, and a public
school with a publicly funded sign-language interpreter during grades six through eight. His par-
ents enrolled him in Salpointe Catholic High School at the beginning of his ninth grade year.
Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
13. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464. The school district first referred the matter to the county
attorney and the Arizona Attorney General, both of whom concluded that providing an interpreter
on the Catholic school's premises would violate the United States Constitution. Id.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(A) (1988) grants jurisdiction to the federal courts for claims
brought under IDEA. It provides: "The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction
of actions brought under this subsection without regard to the amount in controversy." Id.
15. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at A-35).
18. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113
S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
19. Id. at 1194-95. The court found that the aid violated the three-part test for interpreting
the Establishment Clause announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon
test requires state aid to (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement in
religion. Id. at 612-13; see also infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. The court of appeals
held that the interpreter's function would violate the second prong of the test. The court also
indicated that even if the interpreter's services were provided only for secular subjects, the moni-
toring required would violate the entanglement prong of the test. Zobrest, 963 F.2d at 1196 n.5.
20. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2465.
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the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends."'21 The Court held
that because the aid program entitled individual parents to choose where to
send their children to school but did not create a financial incentive for
parents to send their children to a religious school, the presence of the
sign-language interpreter in the Catholic school could not "be attributed to
state decisionmaking." 22 The Court also held that, at most, the Catholic
school would receive only an indirect benefit from the aid, "assuming that
the school makes a profit on each student; [and] that, without an IDEA
interpreter, the child would have gone to school elsewhere and . . the
school... would have been unable to fill that child's spot."'23
The Court disagreed with the school district's argument that providing
the sign-language interpreter was similar to forms of aid that the Court
found unconstitutional in Meek v. Pittenger, and Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball.' In Meek, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania program
that provided publicly funded services including counseling, psychological
services, speech and hearing therapy, and instructional materials and equip-
ment, including tape recorders, to nonpublic schools because it was not cer-
tain that the aid would be used exclusively for secular purposes.26 Similarly
in Ball, the Court struck down two programs that provided public employ-
ees to teach students in religious classrooms because it found a substantial
risk that the aid would result in the advancement of religion at government
expense.27 The Zobrest Court concluded that the aid in those cases "re-
lieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in edu-
cating their students," whereas the aid in Zobrest was not an expense the
school "otherwise would have assumed."28 The Court also noted that
"[hiandicapped children, not sectarian schools, are the primary benefi-
ciaries of the [program]."29 Finally, the Court distinguished the aid by as-
serting that the task of a sign-language interpreter is
quite different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor ....
Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language interpreter
would do more than accurately interpret whatever material is
presented to the class as a whole. In fact, ethical guidelines re-
quire interpreters to "transmit everything that is said in exactly
21. Id. at 2467.
22. Id.
23. id. at 2468.
24. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
25. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
26. Meek, 421 U.S. at 365-66; see also infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
27. Ball, 473 U.S. at 396-97; see also infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
28. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct at 2468-69.
29. Id. at 2469.
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the same way it was intended."... The sign-language interpreter
they have requested will neither add to nor subtract from that en-
vironment, and hence the provision of such assistance is not
baried by the Establishment Clause.
30
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Souter, Stevens, and O'Connor,
dissented from the opinion on the grounds that the Court did not have to
reach the constitutional question.3 1 Justice Blackmun, again joined by Jus-
tice Souter, further dissented from the Court's resolution of the Establish-
ment Clause issue.32 Justice Blackmun contended that secular and religious
components were "inextricably intertwined" in this case because the inter-
preter "would be required to communicate the material covered in religion
class .. .and the daily Masses at which [the school] encourages attend-
ance."23 3 Justice Blackmun argued that even a general aid program "may
have specific applications that are constitutionally forbidden under the Es-
tablishment Clause." 4 He also contended that such an aid program could
be unconstitutional even if it took the form of direct aid to students or their
parents.35 Although secular and nonideological public aid to sectarian
schools had been upheld in the past, Justice Blackmun declared that "[the
Court] has always proscribed the provision of benefits that afford even 'the
opportunity for the transmission of sectarian views."' 36 In this case,
though, the government was "fumish[ing] the medium for communication
of a religious message. '37 As a result, Justice Blackmun asserted that the
state's providing a sign-language interpreter clearly violated the Establish-
ment Clause.38
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2469-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Justices dissented on grounds that the
Court could have remanded the case for consideration of statutory and regulatory issues. Id. at
2469-70 (Blacknun, J., dissenting). In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded
that because only the First Amendment issues were litigated below, the Court could address the
constitutional claim. Id. at 2465-66. This point, though worthy of further discussion, is beyond
the scope of this Note.
32. Id. at 2469, 2471-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Ia at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)
and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985)). In Bowen, the Court held that a general aid
program did not on its face violate the Establishment Clause, but the Court remanded the case for
examination of the constitutionality of particular applications. 487 U.S. at 621-22. In Aguilar, the
Court struck down a publicly funded remedial education program for educationally disadvantaged
children; the Court found that the aid would require excessive government entanglement to ensure
that religion was not advanced. 473 U.S. at 413-14; see infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
35. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Witters v. Washington
Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487 (1986); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 395 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977)).
36. Ma (Blacknun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244).
37. Id. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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As Zobrest demonstrates, the Court has struggled to define the parame-
ters of the Establishment Clause in cases involving public aid to sectarian
schools. 39 The Court first addressed this issue in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation."° In Everson, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute that authorized local school districts to pay for the transporta-
tion of children attending parochial schools.41 In defining the limits of ac-
ceptable aid, the Court stated that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions."'42 In five to
four decision, however, the Court upheld the statute.43 The Court stated
that although the Establishment Clause forbids the government from ad-
vancing religion, it must not "hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their
own religion."'  Because the state contributed no money to the parochial
school, and because the program was similar to other permissible public
services-such as police and fire protection, public roads, and sidewalks-
that are "indisputably marked off from the [school's] religious function,""
the Court found the statute to be "a general program to help parents get
their children... safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools,"
rather than an aid to religion.46 Thus, Everson illustrates the tension be-
tween the Establishment Clause requirement of separation of church and
state and the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion.
Because the separation of church and state is not absolute, the problem be-
comes one of degree.47
39. See generally Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools-An Update, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 5, 6-13 (1987) (reviewing the Court's distinctions of per-
missible state aid to parochial schools under the Establishment Clause).
40. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41. Id at 17. The case involved a local school district that, pursuant to the statute, authorized
reimbursements to parents for money spent to transport their children to school. Part of the money
was used to reimburse parents whose children attended a Catholic parochial school. d at 3.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Id at 18.
44. Id. at 16. The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
45. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
46. Id at 18.
47. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a New York law that per-
mitted public schools to release students during school hours to go to religious centers for reli-
gious instruction). The Court stated:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy
that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference with the "free
exercise" of religion and an "establishment" of religion are concerned, the separation
must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the scope of its cover-
age permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment, however,
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and
State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
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The decision of the Court in Board of Education v. Allen4" further
demonstrates this tension in resolving the degree of separation that the Es-
tablishment Clause requires. In Allen, the Court upheld a New York law
that required public school authorities to provide textbooks to all students,
including those in private sectarian schools.4 9 The Court again recognized
"that the line between state neutrality to religion and state support of reli-
gion is not easy to locate."50 Nevertheless, as in Everson,5 the Court up-
held the program by characterizing it as a general program available to all
students.5" Because the statute authorized only secular textbooks, the Court
held that the aid was intended only to further secular education.53 The
Court refused to find that the sectarian schools would use the secular text-
books to further their religious purpose.54 Thus, the sectarian schools' per-
formance of a secular educational function in addition to their religious
function was sufficient to convince the Court that the aid did not have the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.55
Three years later in the seminal decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman,56 the
Court announced the need for established criteria in its analysis of the Es-
tablishment Clause. The Court stated its intention to "draw lines with refer-
... The problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.
Id. at 312-14; see also Kenneth F. Mott, The Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause:
From Separation to Accommodation and Beyond, 14 J.L. & EDuC. 111, 112-45 (1985) (tracing the
evolution of the Court's separationist and accommodationist positions in its interpretation of the
Establishment Clause).
48. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
49. Id. at 248. The New York law required local school boards, without charge, to "purchase
and to loan upon individual request, to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in
grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies with the compulsory educa-
tion law, textbooks." Id. at 239 n.3 (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 701 (McKinney 1967)).
50. IL at 242.
51. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); see also supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
52. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243.
53. Id. at 244-45.
54. Id. at 248.
55. md. at 243-49.
56. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court struck down Rhode Island and Pennsylvania
statutes that provided "state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools." Id. at 606,
The Rhode Island statute provided a salary supplement for teachers of secular subjects in religious
schools where the average per-pupil expenditure on secular education was below that of the aver-
age in the public schools. Id. at 607. The Pennsylvania statute authorized the state to reimburse
religious schools for expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
secular subjects. Id. at 609-10. The Court held that the statutes violated the Establishment Clause
because they impermissibly resulted in "excessive entanglement between government and reli-
gion." Id. at 613; see also infra note 59 and accompanying text. The Court found there was great
potential for the entangling of religious and secular instruction and that the surveillance necessary
to ensure that such entangling did not take place would itself result in impermissible entangle-
ment. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615-22. The Court also found that such subsidization would impermis-
sibly lead to "political division along religious lines[,] ... one of the principal evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id. at 622 (citation omitted).
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ence to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 57  Accordingly, the
Court presented a three-part test for this analysis: "[F]irst, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose;58 second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 59
Application of the Lemon test resulted in a more separationist ap-
proach to public aid to religious schools. For example, in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,60 the Court struck down
three New York aid programs with the secular legislative purpose of "pre-
serving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of [New York's]
school children," and "promoting pluralism and diversity among its public
and nonpublic schools." 1 These programs failed under the Lemon test be-
cause they impermissibly advanced the religious mission of the sectarian
schools. 2 They included direct money grants to the schools for mainte-
nance and repair, a tuition reimbursement program for parents of children
57. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
58. State programs have consistently survived the secular legislative purpose prong of the
Lemon test because of the Court's "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states,
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the
face of the statute." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983); see also infra notes 61, 70,
76, 91, 108, and 128 and accompanying text. Some commentators have even called for the elimi-
nation of the purpose prong. See, e.g., William B. Peterson, "A Picture Held Us Captive": Con-
ceptual Confusion and the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1827, 1830-49 (1989) (arguing that a
statute's purpose cannot be discovered, and even if it could, it would not be helpful to the Court in
deciding Establishment Clause cases).
59. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (citations omitted)). Justice
White dissented in Lemon, arguing that the decision
creat[ed] an insoluble paradox for the State and the parochial schools. The State cannot
finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but
if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught-a promise the school and its teach-
ers are quite willing and on this record able to give-and enforces it, it is then entangled
in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 668 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice White has argued against a
strict separationist interpretation of the religion clauses in regard to public aid to religious schools,
contending that the denial of such aid would make it "more difficult, if not impossible, for parents
to follow the dictates of their conscience and seek a religious as well as secular education for their
children." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (White,
J., dissenting); see also John J. Coughlin, Common Sense in Formation for the Common Good-
Justice White's Dissents in the Parochial School Aid Cases: Patron of Lost Causes or Precursor
of Good News, 66 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 261,265 (1992) (noting that Justice White "has persistently
dissented from the Supreme Court's strict-separationist, no-aid position").
60. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
61. Id. at 773.
62. Id. at 774-94.
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attending nonpublic schools, and a tax relief program for parents who failed
to qualify for the tuition reimbursement program.63
The Nyquist Court expressed concern that the lack of "appropriate re-
strictions" on the aid might result in impermissible use of the aid for reli-
gious purposes.' 4 The Court was also unpersuaded that the method of
aid--direct reimbursement to parents as opposed to schools-negated the
program's primary effect of advancing religion.6' The Court's recognition
that religious schools performed a secular educational function in addition
to their religious purposes was no longer sufficient to justify state aid, thus
denoting a shift from Everson and Allen.66 The Court required more ade-
quate assurances that the aid would "be used exclusively for secular, neutral
and nonideological purposes."'67
In Meek v. Pittenger,61 however, the Court approved a state program
that lent secular textbooks directly to students in nonpublic schools, includ-
ing religious schools. 69 Relying on Allen, the Court upheld the program
because it found no evidence that the books would "be used for anything
other than purely secular purposes. ' 0
In contrast to the provision regarding textbooks, the Court held that a
provision for lending instructional material and equipment, including tape
recorders, to the religious schools was unconstitutional. 71 Although these
materials were considered "secular, nonideological and neutral," the Court
distinguished them because "it would simply ignore reality to attempt to
separate secular educational functions from the predominantly religious role
performed" by the schools. 72 However, the Court had made precisely this
63. Id. at 762-65.
64. Id. at 774. The Court wanted assurances that the aid would be used exclusively for
secular purposes. However, given the religious orientation of the schools, the Court did not think
the imposition of such restrictions was possible. Id. at 777-80.
65. Id. at 785-87. The Court stated, "if the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them, the Estab-
lishment Clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into
the sectarian institutions." Id. at 786.
66. Id. at 775. Because the second prong was violated, the Court did not have to decide
whether the programs violated the entanglement prong. The Court indicated, however, that
"assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense
of continuing political strife over aid to religion." Id. at 794.
67. Id. at 780.
68. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
69. Id. at 361-62.
70. Id. at 362. In fact, the Court found the program "constitutionally indistinguishable from
the New York textbook loan program upheld in [Allen]." Id. at 359.
71. Id. at 355, 362-63. The instructional materials included periodicals, photographs, maps,
charts, recordings, and films. The instructional equipment also included projectors and laboratory
supplies. Id. at 355.
72. Id. at 365.
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differentiation in regard to the textbooks.73 Nevertheless, the Court held
these materials impermissible because the aid was direct, and the materials
were not capable of restriction to secular purposes.74
The Meek Court also struck down a similar provision that provided
"auxiliary services" in the nonpublic schools, including "counseling, test-
ing, and psychological services, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and
related services for exceptional children, for remedial students, and for the
educationally disadvantaged." 75 Applying the Lemon test, the Court found
that this aid had a secular legislative purpose as required under the first
prong of the test.76 Further, the Court recognized that the publicly funded
employees providing the auxiliary services were less likely than religious
school teachers to intertwine religious and secular education because they
were "not directly subject to the discipline of a religious authority."77
Nevertheless, because most of the schools that benefitted were reli-
gious, the Meek Court found that the services were provided in "an atmos-
phere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief." 8 Hence, the Court
declared that "a diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not suf-
ficient: 'The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsi-
dized teachers do not inculcate religion.' ,,79 Because this certainty could
not occur without a surveillance scheme that amounted to impermissible
entanglement, the Court held the program unconstitutional under the entan-
glement prong of the Lemon test.80
The inconsistencies apparent in Meek also surfaced in Wolman v. Wal-
ter.8 In Wolman, the Court again approved the direct loan of textbooks to
students, but prohibited the loan of other instructional materials and equip-
ment.82 In drafting the challenged statutes, the Ohio legislature had at-
tempted to avoid the direct aid pitfalls associated with the instructional
materials in Meek by characterizing the aid as a loan to the pupil or his
parent rather than a loan to the religious school.83 The Court found, how-
ever, that "[t]he equipment is substantially the same; it will receive the
same use by the students; and it may still be stored and distributed on the
73. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
74. Meek, 421 U.S. at 365.
75. Id. at 352-53.
76. Id. at 367-68. The Court noted the secular legislative purpose of assuring the "full devel-
opment of the intellectual capacities of the children of Pennsylvania." Id.
77. Id at 371-72.
78. d at 371.
79. Id (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
80. l at 372.
81. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
82. Id at 237-38, 249-51.
83. d at 250.
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nonpublic school premises."84 As a result, the Court held that it "would
exalt form over substance if this distinction were found to justify a result
different from that in Meek."85
The Court's contemporary view regarding the Establishment Clause
began to emerge in Mueller v. Allen. 6 In Mueller, the Court again applied
the Lemon test to uphold a Minnesota statute that permitted parents to de-
duct "expenses incurred for the 'tuition, textbooks and transportation' of
dependents attending elementary or secondary schools."8 7 The statute was
similar to the reimbursement and tax relief programs struck down in Ny-
quist.8 8 However, relying on Allen 9 and Everson,9° the Mueller Court up-
held the statute because it had the secular legislative purpose of ensuring
that the state's citizenry was well educated.9" The Court also held that the
statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion because it was
part of a broad program "available for educational expenses incurred by all
parents, including those whose children attend public schools and those
whose children attend ... sectarian private schools."92 The Court distin-
guished its decision from Nyquist on this basis.93
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Mueller, conceded that
the effect of state aid provided to parents in this situation was comparable to
direct aid to the schools their children attended.94 Nevertheless, Justice
Rehnquist contended this was not direct aid, but rather an "attenuated finan-
cial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices of individual par-
ents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available
84. Id.
85. Id. The Wolman Court upheld provisions for diagnostic and therapeutic services, how-
ever. The Court found the diagnostic services permissible because the diagnosticians had limited
contact with the students and provided little or no educational content in their services. The Court
upheld the therapeutic services because they were offered at sites away from the religious schools.
Id. at 244, 247-48.
86. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
87. Id at 391 (quoting MwN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982)).
88. 413 U.S. 756, 762-67 (1973); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. As Justice
Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Mueller, both cases appeared to involve programs for the
relief of financial burdens on religious school parents to the ultimate benefit of religious schools.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 407-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
90. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
91. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95. The Court also noted that there "is a strong public interest
in assuring the continued financial health of private schools, both sectarian and nonsectarian." Id.
at 395.
92. Id. at 397-98.
93. Id. at 398-99. For a discussion of Nyquist, see supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
Cf Ronald D. Rotunda, The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Com-
mercial Speech and State Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C. L. Rnv. 917, 933 (1987)
(arguing that the decision in Mueller is perverse in light of Nyquist "because deductions benefit
the rich more than the poor, while tax credits... do not share that bias").
94. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
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tax benefit at issue."95 The statute thus apparently avoided the "form over
substance" problem of Wolman.f6
The Court further held that the statute was not an incentive for parents
to send their children to religious schools, even though parents who sent
their children to schools that charged tuition received the greatest benefit
under the program.97 Justice Rehnquist declared that "[the Court] would
be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral
law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private
citizens claimed benefits under the law.""8 Justice Rehnquist did point out,
however, that public school parents also benefitted from deductions under
the statute, and that private schools benefitted public schools by substan-
tially relieving the tax burden associated with their operation. 99
The Court also determined that the statute did not involve excessive
entanglement of government and religion because the "only plausible
source" of this entanglement would be the state's determination of
"whether particular textbooks qualify for a deduction."'100 The Court held
that this was the same determination allowed in Allen."° '
Although Mueller appeared to signal a more relaxed application of the
Lemon test, the Court again returned to a strict separationist approach in the
companion cases of Grand Rapids School District v. Ball'02 and Aguilar v.
Felton.'03 In Ball, the Supreme Court found that two publicly funded pro-
grams that provided classes to nonpublic school students in predominantly
sectarian nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause."° One of
the programs, "Shared Time," involved publicly funded teachers moving
from classroom to classroom in nonpublic schools during the course of the
regular school day, teaching courses that were supplementary to Michigan's
accredited school program.105 The second program, "Community Educa-
tion," offered classes in a variety of subjects at the end of the school day in
95. Id. at 399-400.
96. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
97. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 408 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 401.
99. Id. at 402-03.
100. Id. at 403. The Court indicated that because only secular textbooks would qualify for a
deduction, state officials had to determine whether particular books were or were not secular. Id.
101. Id.
102. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
103. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
104. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397. The Court noted that "[florty of the forty-one schools at which
the programs operate[d] [were] sectarian in character." Id. at 379.
105. Id. at 375-76. The public school district supplied materials used in the program. Ap-
proximately 10% of the publicly funded teachers involved in the program had taught previously in
the same nonpublic schools where they were employed. Id. at 376.
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religious schools, as well as at other sites. 106 The teachers in the commu-
nity education program were part-time public school employees. 107
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, agreed with the lower court's
determination that the first prong of the Lemon test was satisfied because
the purpose of the programs was "manifestly secular."' 08 However, Justice
Brennan found the programs unconstitutional under the primary effect
prong because they "pose[d] a substantial risk of state-sponsored indoctri-
nation."'1 9 The Court concluded that the programs impermissibly promoted
religion in three ways:
The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian
nature of the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or
overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at
public expense. The symbolic union of church and state inherent
in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the reli-
gious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state sup-
port for religion to students and to the general public. Finally, the
programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the paro-
chial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their respon-
sibility for teaching secular subjects. 110
Thus, the Court held that the aid was impermissible because it amounted to
a direct subsidy to the religious school."'
In Aguilar v. Felton,"2 a five-member majority of the Court struck
down a New York program that provided for publicly funded employees to
conduct remedial programs" 3 in private religious schools to help with the
needs of educationally deprived children from low-income families." 4
Most of the students in the program were enrolled in public schools."' The
106. Id. at 376-77. The classes included "Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Gym-
nastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess,
Model Building, and Nature Appreciation." Id.
107. Id. at 377.
108. Id. at 383 (quoting the district court's opinion, Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 546 F.
Supp. 1071, 1085 (W.D. Mich. 1982), aftd, 718 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 473 U.S. 373
(1985)).
109. Id. at 387.
110. Id. at 397. Because it concluded that the programs violated the primary effect prong, the
Court did not determine whether the programs also violated the entanglement prong. Id. at 397
n.14.
111. Id. at 396.
112. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
113. The programs included "remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, English
as a second language, and guidance services." Id. at 406. The publicly funded employees included
"teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers" who had volun-
teered to teach in the religious schools. Id.
114. Id. at 404-07.
115. Id. at 406. The Court noted that of those students eligible for the program, 13.2% were
enrolled in private schools, and of that group, 84% were enrolled in sectarian schools. Id.
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city of New York was careful to adopt a monitoring system to ensure that
religion would not be promoted in the secular classes." 6 However, the
Court ruled that the monitoring system itself resulted in a violation of the
Establishment Clause because it amounted to "excessive entanglement of
church and state.""' 7 Thus, as one commentator has stated: "Ball failed for
lack of monitoring; Aguilar failed for too much monitoring. In both cases,
the Court assumed ill effects without requiring evidence to support
them."'1 8
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part in Ball,"9
and dissented in Aguilar ° Applying what came to be known as the en-
dorsement test,12 Justice O'Connor contended that "[i]f a statute lacks a
purpose or effect of advancing religion, [it should not be] invalidate[d]
merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church and
state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance
religion."' 2
Perhaps in response to the dilemma created by the outcomes in Ball
and Anguilar, a unanimous Court held in Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind"3 that the primary effect of public funds provided
to a blind student attending a private Christian college was not the advance-
ment of religion.' 2 Applying the Lemon test, the Washington Supreme
Court had denied the student's request for assistance for vocational rehabili-
tation services because the aid "'clearly ha[d] the primary effect of advanc-
ing religion'"'-the funds would be used to help the student pursue
religious studies at a Christian college.' 2
6
116. L. at 409.
117. Id. The Court held that "the scope and duration of [the program] would require a perma-
nent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid. This pervasive monitor-
ing by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause
values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement." lId at 412-13.
118. Patricia M. Lines, The Entanglement Prong of the Establishment Clause and the Needy
Child in the Private School: Is Distributive Justice Possible?, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 16 (1988).
119. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
122. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
124. Id. at 489. Larry Witters, who suffered from a progressive eye condition, had applied for
vocational rehabilitation aid under a Washington law that "'[provide[d] for special education
and/or training in the professions, business or trades' so as to 'assist visually handicapped persons
to overcome vocational handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and
self-care."' Id. at 483 (quoting WASH. REv. CODE § 74.16.18 (1981)).
125. lId at 485 (quoting Witters v. Washington Comm'n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53,56 (Wash.
1984), rev'd, 474 U.S. (1986)).
126. Id.
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The Supreme Court, also applying the three-part Lemon test, re-
versed. 127 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found a secular purpose
for the aid. 28 He further found that the aid did not have the primary effect
of advancing religion because the aid was paid directly to the student, who
then made a "genuinely independent and private choic[e] of aid recipi-
ents." '129 Thus, the program was "in no way skewed towards religion" and
"create[d] no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian
education." 130
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, noted the absence of Mueller v. Allen"' from the Court's opin-
ion. Justice Powell emphasized that Mueller strongly supported the Court's
decision because it made clear that "state programs that are wholly neutral
in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference to
religion do not violate the second part of the [Lemon] test, because any aid
to religion results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries." 132
Under the Lemon test, the Court has continued to shift between separa-
tionist and accommodationist approaches when dealing with public aid to
religious schools. Perhaps as a result of these varying outcomes, the Court
has expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional Lemon test.1 33 Accord-
ingly, the Court has increasingly looked to alternative methods of interpre-
tation in its Establishment Clause analysis. The method of interpretation
that has moved to the fore is the endorsement test, first espoused by Justice
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.1 34 The endorsement test is a modification
of the first two prongs of the traditional Lemon test. Instead of focusing on
the secular purpose and primary effect of state aid, the endorsement test
127. Id.
128. Id. at 485-86. The Court noted that the "program was designed to promote the
well-being of the visually handicapped through the provision of vocation rehabilitation services."
Id.
129. Id. at 487.
130. Id. at 488. Notably, Justice Marshall also observed that "nothing in the record indi-
cate[d] that, if petitioner succeed[ed], any significant portion of the aid expended under the
Washington program as a whole [would] end up flowing to religious education" because no
other person had ever sought to finance religious education under the program. Id. As a result,
the Court did not find it "appropriate to view any aid ultimately flowing to the [Christian college]
as resulting from a state action sponsoring or subsidizing religion." Id. The Court declined to
address the entanglement issue, indicating that it would be inappropriate to do so without the
benefit of a lower court decision on that issue. Id. at 489 n.5.
131. 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
132. Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (emphasizing the Court's "un-
willingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area").
134. Ld. at 690-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch the Court upheld a city's inclusion of
a nativity scene in its Christmas display. Id. at 687.
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focuses on whether the "government intends to convey" or has "the effect
of communicating a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."'135
The endorsement test gained increased support in County of Allegheny
v. ACLU.'36 In Allegheny, the Court held that a creche displayed in a
county courthouse was impermissible under the Establishment Clause be-
cause it sent a message of governmental endorsement of religion.137 The
influence of the endorsement test is evident in Zobrest from the Court's
concern with whether public aid in religious schools can "be attributed to
state decisionmaking."'138
In light of this background, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dis-
trict signifies a strong move by the Court to accommodate public aid to
religious schools. Zobrest may also represent a new method of Establish-
ment Clause interpretation in which the Court bases its holding solely on
factual similarities of previous cases instead of invoking the Lemon test.
A comparison of the facts in Zobrest with those in earlier cases evi-
dences the Court's shift in Establishment Clause interpretation. The aid
approved in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind139
demonstrates that the aid in Zobrest would not have presented an Establish-
ment Clause problem if state funds had been given directly to James
Zobrest's parents to hire an interpreter."4 However, as Justice Blackmun
observed, Zobrest did not involve simply the "disbursement of funds."''
Rather, this case marks the first time the Court permitted a publicly funded
employee to be directly involved in a student's ongoing religious indoctri-
nation in a parochial school. 42
Prior to this case, as Justice Blackmun observed, the Supreme Court
had endeavored to eliminate "even 'the opportunity for the transmission of
135. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a discussion of the endorsement test, see
Christopher S. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorsement
Test, 68 N.C. L. Ray. 590, 598-612 (1990).
136. 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).
137. Id. at 598-602. Notably, however, the court found that a menorah displayed next to a
Christmas tree in front of a city-county building did not impermissibly endorse religion "given its
'particular physical setting.'" Id. at 621.
138. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
139. 474 U.S. 481 (1986); see also supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
140. As the Court pointed out, the school district readily conceded this fact. Zobrest, 113 S.
Ct. at 2469 n.ll. However, Witters could have been distinguished from Zobrest because Witters
involved aid to a student attending a Christian college, not a religious elementary or secondary
school. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 93, at 932-33 (observing that the Court has been "quite
generous in allowing states to give financial assistance directly to religious institutions when
schools are on the college or graduate level" but has forbidden similar aid to religiously affiliated
elementary or high schools).
141. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2467-69.
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sectarian views"' by a publicly funded employee in a religious school.1 43
Under this approach even inadvertent transmission of sectarian views would
have violated the Establishment Clause. 144  Yet, by allowing a
state-provided interpreter to relate the content of religion classes and wor-
ship services, the Zobrest Court seems to permit such public funding of
religious instruction. 45
One of the bases the Court gave for distinguishing the aid in Zobrest
from that struck down in previous cases 146 was that the task of a
sign-language interpreter is different from that of a teacher or guidance
counselor. 4 7 An interpreter does not add anything to the school's instruc-
tion, but simply "'transmit[s] everything that is said in exactly the same
way it was intended.' "1 48 Thus, an interpreter is acceptable because there is
no teaching or indoctrinating involved, but rather a neutral transmission of
information.' 49 If the school intends for the information transmitted by the
interpreter to indoctrinate, however, a distinction is difficult to find. 5 As
Justice Blackmun pointed out, "[a] state-employed sign-language inter-
preter would be required to communicate the material covered in religion
class ... and the daily Masses at which [the religious school] encourages
attendance."'' Thus, the publicly funded interpreter is actively participat-
ing in the child's religious indoctrination.'
In addition, based on the Court's reasoning that an interpreter is ac-
ceptable because she neutrally relates information, an interpreter's function
143. Id. at 2473 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244
(1977)).
144. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Bal, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) ("[Tihe [Establish-
ment] Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrina-
tion into the beliefs of a particular religious faith:); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370-71
(1975) (requiring the state to ensure that "[state] personnel do not advance the religious mission
of... church-related schools"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971) ("The State must
be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.").
145. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2472 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146. See, e.g., Meek, 421 U.S. at 355, 362-63; Ball, 473 U.S. at 397; see also supra notes
68-80, 104-11 and accompanying text.
147. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469.
148. Id. at 2469 (quoting Joint Appendix at 73, Zobrest (No. 92-94)).
149. ld
150. Id. at 2472 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
152. But see Dixie S. Huefner & Steven F. Huefner, Publicly Financed Interpreter Services
for Parochial School Students with IDEA-B Disabilities, 21 J.L. & EDuc. 223, 236 (1992). These
commentators argue that the provision of interpreters
does not involve the government in actual inculcation any more than does provision of
buses, eyeglasses, Kurzweil reading machines for the blind, or other equipment that may
have the incidental effect of providing small-scale, personalized access to religious in-
struction. The relevant consideration is whether the publicly paid employees are re-
sponsible for the inculcation.
1054 [Vol. 72
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
is in effect no different from that of a tape recorder. In both Meek v. Pit-
tenger,153 and Wolman v. Walter,1 54 however, the Court expressly held that
state aid in the form of recording equipment was impermissible because
there was no guarantee that the equipment would be used exclusively for
secular purposes. 155 The Meek Court also struck down the state's practice
of providing public employees for hearing therapy because of the risk that
the employees might impermissibly promote religion.156 Nevertheless, in
Zobrest, the Court permitted analogous aid in the form of an interpreter.' 5 7
Perhaps anticipating such objections, the Zobrest Court also held that
the interpreter is distinguishable from prior cases because the state is not
directly aiding the religious school, as in Meek and Ball, by relieving it "of
an expense that it otherwise would have assumed in educating its stu-
dents."' 58 As a result, the Court ruled that the aid was more akin to that
approved in Mueller and Witters.159 Still, this distinction does not address
the argument that religious indoctrination is taking place by means of a
publicly funded employee, which could lead to contorted results.
Suppose, for example, that James Zobrest had a wonderful experience
at the Catholic school he was attending. His parents then relate his experi-
ence to friends who also have deaf children, and the friends then apply for
assistance under the IDEA program and enroll their children in the Catholic
school. The government would apparently be required to provide an inter-
preter at the school for each deaf student who qualified for aid under the
program. Assuming that the number of deaf students in the school in-
creased significantly, however, it might be more efficient simply to provide
an interpreter for each classroom in which there is at least one deaf student.
This could lead-apparently without violation of the Establishment
153. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
154. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
155. See supra notes 71-74, 82-85 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. The provision of such auxiliary services
was allowed in Wolman, but only because the services were offered at sites away from the reli-
gious schools. See supra note 85.
157. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. Arguably, the decision in Zobrest is broader than necessary.
This case could be distinguished in the future because it deals with a person who is handicapped.
Although the opinion did not address the issue, the Court may have been concerned that not
providing an interpreter would impermissibly impair James Zobrest's right to choose a private
education because his education at the Catholic school would not have been possible without an
interpreter. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding a state law that
compelled students to attend public schools unconstitutional because it impermissibly interfered
with the liberty of parents to direct the upbrining and education of their children); see also
Huefner & Huefner, supra note 152, at 227 (arguing that, although parents are not entitled to
reimbursement for the private education they have selected under the IDEA, "the public school
must make special education and related services available to the private school student even
though the student attends a private schoor).
158. Zobrest, 113 S. CL at 2469.
159. Id. at 2466-68; see also supra notes 86-101 and 123-32 and accompanying text.
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Clause-to assignment of an interpreter solely to religion classes, or solely
to the chapel to interpret worship services. Such a result appears pro-
foundly illogical if the Establishment Clause is meant to afford protection
against "active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."16
Further, if the enrollment of deaf students in the school did signifi-
cantly increase, at some point the school conceivably would have an eco-
nomic interest in retaining the students. Thus, providing interpreters could
be an expense the school would otherwise have assumed were it not for the
government program. Under the Court's reasoning in Zobrest, then, a dis-
tinction no longer exists between this aid and that struck down in Meek and
Ball." ' However, does that necessarily mean the Court would find the aid
unconstitutional? The interpreters would still be present in the Catholic
school as part of a broad, general program that neutrally provides aid to
parents who then individually choose where to send their children to school,
with no financial incentive for them to choose a religious school.16 2 The
Court's reasoning in Mueller does not make clear that the lack of such a
distinction would lead to a different result.' 63
On the other hand, Justice Blackmun argued in his dissent "that gov-
ernment crosses the boundary [of constitutionality] when it furnishes the
medium for communication of a religious message."' But what if the aid
provided in this case had been a hearing aid rather than an interpreter?
Would a hearing aid present the same constitutional problems as an inter-
preter or a tape recorder? Certainly the functions of all three are similar,
but it is not clear under the dissent's reasoning that this "medium" would
necessarily be unconstitutional. The hearing aid would appear to alleviate
Justice Blackmun's concerns about the "ongoing, daily, and intimate gov-
ernmental participation" in religious teaching.' 6 Government involvement
in the form of a hearing aid, like the provision of funds, would stop once the
school or government provided the hearing aid.166 Yet, if the dissent found
the hearing aid did not present the same constitutional problems, would
disallowing interpreters for deaf students for whom a hearing aid is insuffi-
cient be equitable? Certainly such an outcome seems unfair to those with
the most severe problems.1 67
160. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
161. See supra notes 68-80, 104-11 and accompanying text.
162. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-68.
163. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
164. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the cash payments approved in Witters
and Mueller from the function of a state-funded interpreter).
167. See generally Lines, supra note 118, at 12-23 (arguing that the Court's application of the
Establishment Clause results in inequitable treatment of disadvantaged children).
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In any event, a state-funded interpreter involved in the ongoing teach-
ing of religious doctrine presents serious Establishment Clause problems.
As Justice Blackmun observed, such aid may impermissibly "place the im-
primatur of governmental approval upon [a] favored religion, conveying a
message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to its tenets."' 168 Fur-
thermore, the presence of a publicly funded interpreter in religious schools
could lead to problems of individual liberty if the religious school required
specific forms of dress or conduct for anyone upon their premises. 169
Perhaps a better solution, as in Witters,170 would be to limit state aid
to funds provided directly to individuals so that they could, in essence,
purchase their own aid. This approach would alleviate the ongoing nature
of government involvement that the dissent in Zobrest finds troublesome. 1
7
Arguably, like the distinction attempted in Wolman,172 this solution is mere
"form over substance."' 73 Still, given the precedent leading up to Zobrest
and the problems that may arise from the aid provided in it,174 this resolu-
tion would seem to be a less troublesome and more consistent determination
of where to draw the line between church and state when dealing with pub-
lic aid to religious schools. 7 '
Finally, Zobrest may represent a new method of Establishment Clause
interpretation in regard to public aid to religious schools. The Court's ap-
plication of the Lemon test has received widespread criticism virtually since
the test's inception.176 Commentators have criticized the test as vague,
168. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun pointed out,
[a] traditional Hindu school would be likely to instruct its students and staff to dress
modestly, avoiding any display of their bodies. And an orthodox Jewish yeshiva might
well forbid all but kosher food upon its premises. To require public employees to obey
such rules would impermissibly threaten individual liberty, but to fail to do so might
endanger religious autonomy.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
171. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
173. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977).
174. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
175. Certainly, this solution could have other drawbacks, such as the logistical problems asso-
ciated with finding an interpreter.
176. Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutral-
ity, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 Nomnw DA~mE L. REv. 151, 163-64 (1987); see also
Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
Prrr. L. Rav. 637, 680 (1980) ("[A]pplication of the Court's three-prong test has generated ad
hoe judgments which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled basis."); Philip B. Kur-
land, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 24 Vn.. L. REv. 3, 18, 20 (1978). Professor Kurland argues that
the three-prong test has resulted in as much confusion and conflict under the establish-
ment clause as the Court's decisions under the free exercise clause. . . . [The
three-prong test hardly elucidates the Court's judgments. Nor does it cover the plastic
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leading to inconsistent results, and "simply incorrect." 177 Indeed, members
of the Court have also expressed their dissatisfaction with test.178 Most
recently, Justice Scalia attacked the Court's use of the Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys
.... Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently
sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven pen-
cils through the creature's heart .. .and a sixth has joined an
opinion doing SO. 17 9
Yet the Court has expressly refused to overrule the test.'80
As evidenced in the Court's use of the endorsement test,' 8 however,
the Court has strived to refine its Establishment Clause interpretation. 18 2
Zobrest, then, may represent a new trend in regard to public aid to religious
schools under which the Court will look to the facts of prior cases rather
than applying the Lemon test anew.
The Court has established considerable precedent in the area of public
aid to religious schools. 8 3 As a result, neither the majority nor the dissent
in Zobrest had to apply the Lemon test in its opinion. Further, the only
indication of the endorsement test in the majority opinion appears to be the
Court's contention that the presence of the interpreter in the Catholic school
nature of the judgments in this area. Judicial discretion, rather than constitutional man-
date, controls the results.
ld. at 18, 20.
177. Beschle, supra note 176, at 163-64.
178. Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated that "[the three-part test has simply not provided
adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to
realize." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Further, a major-
ity of the Court seems to have approved a modification of Lemon, as seen in its use of the endorse-
ment test. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
179. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149-50 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Alle-
gheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting);
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434
U.S. 125, 134-35 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
180. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (refusing to reconsider Lemon).
181. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-61 (finding an Establishment Clause violation when
government activity coerces individuals to participate in a religious activity).
183. See supra notes 40-132 and accompanying text.
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could not "be attributed to state decisionmaking." 184 This treatment may
indicate that the Court will ignore its stated Establishment Clause test crite-
ria in future cases dealing with public aid to religious schools. Such a
change in the Court's analysis, however, would appear to further confuse an
already confused area by making future decisions even more unpredictable.
Zobrest illustrates the Court's continuing trend of accommodating in-
creasingly broad areas of public aid to religious schools. By allowing a
publicly funded interpreter to be involved in a parochial school student's
religious indoctrination, the Court has made an unprecedented move in this
area. In addition, as demonstrated in the lower court's contrary decision in
this case,' 85 the Supreme Court's disregard of the Lemon test arguably al-
lowed the Court to reach this result. If the Court continues this approach of
looking to the facts of prior cases rather than applying the Lemon test, such
accommodationist results are likely to continue. However, deciding such
important Establishment Clause issues on a case by case basis will only add
more uncertainty to the law.
T. JONATHAN ADAMS
184. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467.
185. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. But see Huefner & Huefner, supra note
152, at 235-39 (arguing that the Lemon test can accommodate interpreter services on parochial
school premises).
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